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Abstract 
This paper examines the impact of corporate governance quality and board gender diversity on 
the corporate dividend policy for a set of all non-financial companies listed on Amman Stock 
Exchange (ASE) during the period 2009-2015. The results documented that corporate 
governance quality and board gender diversity proxies have positive impact on corporate 
dividend policy. The results also showed that the women representation on the boards of non-
financial companies in Jordan is considered low relative to other countries. Particularly, the 
causes of the poor board gender diversity in Jordan range from lack of awareness about the 
benefits of gender diversity to the lack of legislation that regulates this issue. It is recommended 
to non-financial companies in Jordan to boost their compliance with the corporate governance 
code and adopt diversity policies to enhance the effectiveness of the boards and keep favorable 
relationships with their shareholders. Furthermore, regulatory bodies in Jordan should take a step 
towards encouraging gender diversity on boards. 
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Introduction 
 
The ultimate economic goal for corporations is to make profit where such profit can be held 
in the corporation and used in its activities or it can be distributed to shareholders in form of 
dividends which requires a trade-off between the payable amount value and the value to 
retain (Almeida et al, 2015). Kaźmierska-Jóźwiak (2015) suggested that dividend policy is 
considered a controversial issue in corporate finance, and the investment, financing and 
dividend decisions are considered the major pillars of decision making in corporate finance. 
Whereas, Jensen (1986) suggested that the conflict of interest between shareholders and 
managers could have an impact on the corporate dividend policy since managers prefer to 
retain earnings instead of distributing the earnings to the shareholders in form of dividends. 
In contrast, shareholders prefer higher level of cash distributions especially when the firm has 
few internal positive net present value (NPV) investment opportunities. 
The issue of women on boards gained much attention over the last ten years and now at least 
12 countries are regularly reviewing the gender balance of their top boards. Particularly, 
different actions have been taken by countries in order to increase the women representation 
at boards and top management level where some countries force a quota or consider 
legislation for quotas while other countries adopt alternative action through “comply or 
explain” approach or the “if not, why not” approach, (Davies, 2011) . Board gender diversity 
is considered a key factor contributing to the quality of corporate governance where several 
corporate governance codes in developed countries emphasized the importance of gender 
diversity to avoid the problems arising from like-minded individuals and thus enhance the 
effectiveness of the boards. For instance; the UK corporate governance code (2016) stated 
that “The problems arising from “groupthink” have been exposed in particular as a result of 
the financial crisis. One of the ways in which constructive debate can be encouraged is 
through having sufficient diversity on the board. This includes, but is not limited to, gender 
and race”; Japan’s corporate governance code (2015) stated in “Principle 2.4 Ensuring 
Diversity, Including Active Participation of Women: Companies should recognize that the 
existence of diverse perspectives and values reflecting a variety of experiences, skills and 
characteristics is a strength that supports their sustainable growth. As such, companies should 
promote diversity of personnel, including the active participation of women.” 
German corporate governance code (2014) stated that “When appointing the Management 
Board, the Supervisory Board shall also respect diversity and in particular, aim for an 
appropriate consideration of women”; In Australian, Corporate Governance Principles and 
Recommendations (2014) stated in Recommendation 1.5 “A listed entity should: (a) have a 
diversity policy which includes requirements for the board or a relevant committee of the 
board to set measurable objectives for achieving gender diversity and to assess annually both 
the objectives and the entity’s progress in achieving them”. However, in less developed 
countries (such as Jordan) less attention has been paid to the issue of board gender diversity. 
So far, the existing legislations in Jordan and the corporate governance code issued by Jordan 
Securities Commission (JSC) have not yet taken any step towards the issue of board gender 
diversity. Despite that the International Finance Corporation (IFC) in 2014 recommended 
developing and emerging markets including Jordan to encourage board diversity by 
promoting women’s leadership; providing and sharing arguments on the benefits of board 
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diversity; and starting a policy-level dialogue aimed at increasing the number of women on 
boards. 
The literature in Jordan reveals that there is linkage between corporate governance and 
dividend policy. However, less attention has been paid to the area regarding the linkage 
between the quality of corporate governance and the corporate dividend policy. As well, to 
the best of researcher knowledge, there is no other study examined the impact of board 
gender diversity on corporate dividend policy which resulted in a gap in the existing 
literature which this paper is motivated to fill. Particularly, the purpose of this paper is to 
examine the impact of corporate governance quality and board gender diversity on the 
corporate dividend policy. This paper is mainly motivated by the international interest to the 
corporate governance as well to the gender diversity on boards as an important factor  
contributing to the quality of corporate governance. 
 
1. Theoretical Background 
 
1.1.Corporate governance, Gender diversity and Dividend policy 
 
Corporate governance is defined as “"the system by which companies are directed and 
controlled" (Cadbury, 1992). As well, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) defined corporate governance as “Procedures and processes according 
to which an organisation is directed and controlled. The corporate governance structure 
specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities among the different participants in the 
organisation – such as the board, managers, shareholders and other stakeholders – and lays 
down the rules and procedures for decision-making”. Particularly, as a result of the global 
financial crisis; the response of the regulatory authorities was directed to corporate 
governance (Rakin, et al., 2012). The agency problem arises from the separation of 
ownership from control, and corporate governance practices initially appeared to minimize 
the conflict of interest between managers and shareholders (Baydoun, et al., 2012; Al-
Rahahleh, 2016). Agency relationship is defined as a contract between one party (the 
principal) and another party (the agent) to perform some services on their behalf. In other 
words, it is a delegation of decision-making authority given by principal to the agent. 
Particularly, the agency problem arises since the decisions taken by the agent affect both his 
own wealth and the wealth of shareholders (Jensen & Meckling 1976; McColgan, 2001). 
Board gender diversity provides corporations with positive outcomes since diversity 
generates greater variety of perspectives and this increase the likelihood of creative and 
innovations in the board which reflects positively the effectiveness of the board and its 
decisions (Byoun et al., 2015). According to several authors (Croson  & Gneezy, 2009; 
Faccio et al., 2012; Huang &Kisgen, 2013; Van pelt 2013; Van Uytbergen & Schoubben, 
2015), there is a difference between men and women where women are more risk averse than 
men as well women will adopt less aggressive strategy choice and will invest in more 
sustainable projects than men. (Joecks et al., 2013; Van pelt, 2013) suggested that when 
proportion of women on board is small, this will reflect negatively the firm performance. In 
contrast, when this proportion increases, this will reflect positively the firm performance 
since presence of women become an advantage to the firm. In particular, the U shaped 
relation suggested that the firm performance will go down to a certain point after this point 
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the performance will go up where this point is considered when more than 40% of the board 
is women.(Van Uytbergen & Schoubben, 2015) indicated that gender diversity affects 
corporation decision making in particular the presence of women either in board of directors 
or in management positions affects the corporate governance and the corporate policy. 
Likewise, (Byoun et al., 2016) suggested that board diversity either gender or racial is 
considered an important factor contributing to good corporate governance.  
Dividend policy can be defined as the policy a firm uses to decide how much it will pay to 
shareholders in dividends (Ranti, 2013). Dividends are considered an information signal of 
firm performance to financial markets where regular dividends is an indicator the firm is 
doing well (Al-Amarneh &Yaseen, 2014). Similarly, (Naser et al, 2013; Abu Manneh, 2014) 
suggested that dividend policy is considered important signal of company’s prospect of 
stability and growth, and eliminating dividends is a signal of poor firm performance. 
Particularly, the dividend principle assumes that the firms have to return the generated cash 
to the shareholders as dividends when there are no investments opportunities (Almeida et al., 
2015). However, the free cash flow hypothesis implies that managers tend to invest the free 
cash flow in negative net present value (NPV) projects instead of paying it out to the 
shareholders in form of dividends where the free cash flow is defined as “cash flow left after 
the firm has invested in all available positive NPV projects.” (Jensen, 1988; Lang 
&Walkling, 1991). Furthermore, (Sindhu, 2014) indicated that the free cash flow hypothesis 
considered dividends as a way to prevent managers from investing the free cash flow in size-
increasing but non profitable projects.   
The bird-in-hand theory asserts that in the world of uncertainty and information asymmetry 
investors prefer dividend to retained earnings (Al-Malkawi, 2007). Likewise, (Van 
Uytbergen & Schoubben, 2015) suggested that investors in particular risk averse investors 
prefer dividends to capital gains since dividends are certain and capital gains are not. 
Whereas, (Naser et al., 2013) indicated that shareholders and potential investors formulate 
investment impressions about the company by looking into management’s ability to generate 
dividends. 
Dividend payout plays a key role in resolving the conflict of interest between managers and 
shareholders since dividends can reduce the free cash flow problem (Byoun et al., 2016). 
Corporate governance quality mitigates agency problems and board gender diversity 
contributes to the efficiency of corporate governance. Thus, it is expected the corporate 
governance and board gender diversity could have an impact on the corporate dividend 
policy. 
 
2. Previous Research 
Previous research asserts that dividend policy is one of most debated topics in corporate 
finance. Debate about what drive firms to pay out dividends is still valid question (Ranti, 
2013). Several empirical studies documented that corporate governance practices and 
presence of women on boards is considered determinants of corporate dividend policy. In this 
regards, Mitton (2004) studied the impact of corporate governance on dividend policy across 
365 firms from 19 countries, the results showed a positive relationship between corporate 
governance and dividend payouts. Al‐Malkawi (2007) studied the determinants of corporate 
AABFJ  |Volume 11, no. 2, 2017 
 
90 
 
dividend policy across set of all companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange during the 
period (1998 to 2000).The results revealed that the dividend payout is affected by insider 
ownership and state ownership which supports agency cost theories. Furthermore, the 
outcomes showed that firm size, age and profitability are considered determinants factors of 
corporate dividend policy. Kowalewski et al. (2008) studied the determinants of dividend 
policy and whether corporate governance is considered as a determinant of companies’ 
dividend policy across 110 non-financial companies listed on Warsaw Stock Exchange in 
Poland during the period (1998-2004). The study used Transparency and Disclosure Index 
(TDI) to measure corporate governance quality where the results revealed that an increase in 
TDI increased the dividend payout ratio. 
Sawicki (2009) examined the association between corporate governance and dividend policy 
across five East Asian countries during the period 1994–2003. The results showed a negative 
association between corporate governance and dividend policy across prior crisis period. 
However, the results revealed that dividend policy is affected positively by corporate 
governance across post crisis period. Van Pelt (2013) studied the impact of board 
characteristics on dividend policy for a sample of all S&P 500 firms during the period 2008 -
2011. In particular, the final number of companies included in the analysis was 436 firms 
with 1350 firm year observations. The results showed a positive association between board 
size and dividend policy. However, the results showed that the percentage of inside directors, 
the percentage of women, insiders’ ownership and Directors’ tenure are statistically 
insignificant related to dividend policy. Setiawan et al., (2013) tested the impact of corporate 
governance on dividend policy for a sample of 248 manufacturing firms listed on Indonesian 
Stock Exchange during the period 2004-2006. The study used Transparency and Disclosure 
Index (TDI) to measure corporate governance in Indonesia. The results revealed that the 
dividend policy is affected negatively by corporate governance which supports substation 
theory. Al-Amarneh&Yaseen (2014) examined the association between corporate 
governance and dividend policy among 47 industrial companies in Jordan listed on Amman 
Stock Exchange during the period 2005-2011. Corporate governance was measured based on 
four factors namely; corporate holdings, financial institution holdings, insiders holding and 
foreign holding while dividend policy was measured based on dividend yield. The outcomes 
showed a positive association between insider holding and dividend yield. In contrast, the 
results showed a negative association among foreign holdings and dividend yield. 
Van Uytbergen  & Schoubben (2015) studied whether gender diversity in corporations 
affects companies’ financial policy for a sample of non-financial European companies from 
14 countries during the period 2008-2012. The results showed that firms with board gender 
diversity affects cash policy not through risk aversion but through increased board 
effectiveness. Whereas, after controlling corporate governance quality, the results showed 
that board size and insider ownership have a positive impact on cash policy. Byoun et al. 
(2016) studied the impact of board of directors diversity and dividend policy for a sample of 
2,234 unique firms with 13,325 firm-year observations during the period 1997-2008. The 
results pointed out that firms with diverse boards are more likely to pay dividends especially 
when the firm generate large free cash flows. Furthermore, the results suggested that diverse 
boards play a positive role in enhancing the monitoring and disciplining functions of the 
boards for the benefits of shareholders. Pucheta-Martínez&Bel-Oms (2015) studies the effect 
of gender diversity on dividend policy across Spanish companies. The outcomes showed that 
dividend payout is affected positively the percentage of female directors and by proportion of 
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shares held by female directors. However, the dividend policy is affected negatively by 
percentage of institutional female directors. Whereas, the percentage of independent and 
executive female directors have no effect on dividend payout. Yusof & Ismail (2016) studied 
the determinants of dividend policy for a sample of 147 publically listed firms in Malaysia. 
The results showed that dividend policy is affected positively by earnings, debt, size and 
investment. However, the outcomes showed that dividend policy is affected negatively by 
debt and large shareholders. 
 
4. Research Design and Variables Measurement 
 
4.1. Study sample 
 
The study sample consisted of all non-financial (i.e. industrial and service) companies listed 
on Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) during the period (2009 – 2015). Consistent with (Fama& 
French, 2002; Van pelt, 2013), financial companies were excluded from the study sample due 
to their different accounting and reporting rules. The reason behind starting the study period 
from 2009 is that corporate governance code for shareholding companies listed on the ASE 
was issued by JSC in 2009. In order to include the company in the study sample, required 
data to calculate all study variables should be available for the study period. A sample of 110 
companies met the required criterion with 770 firm-year observations. To avoid the impact of 
extreme values, the values in the 99
th
 percentile and those in the 1
st
 percentile for each of the 
study variables were considered as missing values. 
 
4.2. Variables measurement 
4.2.1. Dependent variable: Corporate Dividend Policy 
Following (Byoun et al., 2016), corporate dividend policy is measured based on three proxies 
namely; Div_Dum: is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm pays a cash dividend and 
zero otherwise; Div_TA: is dividend-to-asset ratio; Div_E: is dividend per share divided by 
earnings per share before extraordinary items. These measures take into account the 
propensity to pay dividends and the amount of dividend payouts. 
4.2.2. Independent variables: Corporate Governance Quality and Board Gender Diversity 
4.2.2.1 Corporate Governance Quality 
Corporate governance quality is measured based on governance index that used by (Prommin 
et al., 2014) in measuring corporate governance quality. Consistent with (Abbadi et al., 2016; 
Al-Rahahleh, 2016), the index is modified in accordance with the rules required by corporate 
governance code issued by JSC. The governance index is classified into 4 categories with a 
total of 10 standards where one point is awarded for each standard that is satisfied and hence 
zero point otherwise. All these standards are required by corporate governance code issued 
by JSC under “comply or explain” approach except standard 9 which is voluntarily adopted. 
Table 1 provides the governance standards that range from 1 to 10 as well the table also 
provides the rule on each standard that is required by corporate governance code for 
shareholding companies listed on the ASE. 
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4.2.2.2. Board Gender Diversity 
Board gender diversity is measured based on four proxies namely; W_B: is proportion of women 
on boards; W_EXE: is proportion of executive women on boards; W_OWN: is Percentage of 
shares held by women on boards; WM_OWN: is percentage of shares owned by company’s 
women major shareholders. 
Table 1. corporate governance quality index 
Category  Governance standard Rule in Corporate governance Code 
 
 
 
 
Board of directors 
1)  Member of board of directors 
are not less than five and not more 
than thirteen 
“The administration of the Company is entrusted to a board 
of directors whose members shall be not less than five and 
not more than thirteen” 
2)  One-third of the directors are 
independent directors 
 
“at least one third of the board members are independent 
members.”  
3) Chairman and CEO positions are 
separated 
 
 
“It is not allowed for one person to hold the positions of 
chairman of the board of directors and any executive 
position in the company at the same time” 
 
Board meetings 
4) Disclosure about number of the 
board meetings 
 
“The board of directors shall meet at least once every two 
months, provided that the number of meetings in the fiscal 
year must not be less than six and the number of meetings 
shall be disclosed in the company’s annual report” 
5) The number of board meetings is 
not less than six 
 
 
Audit 
6) Existence of Audit Committee The board of directors shall form the following permanent 
committees: 
The Audit Committee that shall undertake the task of 
overseeing and monitoring accounting and internal control 
and auditing activities in the company 
7) Disclosure of frequency of Audit 
Committee meetings 
 
The Committee shall meet regularly, not less than four 
times a year, and minutes of its meetings must be taken 
appropriately 
8) Expertise of Audit Committee . All members of the Audit Committee must have 
knowledge and experience in finance and accounting, and at 
least one of them must have worked previously in 
accounting or finance fields, or that person must have an 
academic or professional certificate in accounting, finance 
or related fields 
9) Engagement of Big 4 auditors 
(PWC, KPMG, E&Y or Deloitte) 
 
The company’s external auditor should: 
A. Possess a valid license to practice the profession. 
B. Be a member of the Jordan Association of Certified 
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4.2.3. Control variables 
Consistent with prior studies, the study employed three control variables namely; Firm Size 
(FS); Financial Leverage (LVG); and Return on Assets (ROA). Firm size measured as the 
natural logarithm of firm’s total assets. Kuzucu (2015) argued that large companies tend to 
pay higher amount of dividends to decrease agency costs. Whereas, (Dickens et al., 2002; 
Maladjian& El Khoury, 2014) argued that large companies pay higher amount of dividends 
since these companies tend to be more competitive and attract investors. Financial leverage is 
also included as a control variable which measured as the ratio of total debt to total assets. It 
is expected that firms with high financial leverage are less likely to pay dividends since these 
firms need funding and thus are not able to pay dividends to their shareholders. Kuzucu 
(2015) indicated that firms that need fund either retain more earnings or issue more debt 
consequently firms with less financial leverage are more likely to pay dividends to their 
shareholders. Return on Assets (ROA), calculated by dividing net income plus interest 
expense on the average total assets, is employed as a proxy of firm profitability. It is 
expected that profitable firms are more likely to be able to pay higher amount of dividends. 
(Ho, 2003; Aivazian et al., 2003) argued that profitable firms pay higher amount of dividends 
to convey their strong financial performance. 
 
  
Public Accountants. 
C. Have practiced the profession on a full time basis for at 
least three consecutive years, after receiving his license to 
practice the auditing profession. 
D. Have in his firm at least one partner or employee who 
must also meet the above- mentioned requirements. 
Nominations and 
Compensations 
10) Existence of Nominations and 
Remunerations Committee 
 
The board of directors shall form the following permanent 
committees: 
 
 The Nominations and Remunerations Committee, whose 
main tasks are: 
1. Ensuring the independence of independent members on a 
continuous basis. 
2. Setting the policy of compensations, privileges, 
incentives, and salaries and to review them on a yearly 
basis. 
3. Defining the company's needs of qualifications at the 
upper executive management and employees levels, and the 
criteria for their selection. 
4. Drawing the company’s human resources and training 
policy, monitoring its implementation, and reviewing it on 
an annual basis 
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5. Analyses and Discussion  
5.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table (2) depicts the descriptive statistics for the study variables related to 770 firm-year 
observations of 110 non-financial companies listed on ASE during the period (2009-2015). The 
proportion of women on boards ranges from 0 to 0.50 with an average of 0.043, which implies 
that the presence of women on the boards of non-financial companies listed on the ASE is 
considered low. Furthermore, the proportion of executive women on boards ranges from 0 to 
0.22 with an average of 0.0044, an indication that across the study sample the dominant women 
on boards are non-executive board members.  As can be noticed from table (2), percentage of 
shares held by women on boards ranges from 0 to 0.20 with an average of 0.0031. Moreover, 
percentage of shares held by company’s women major shareholders ranges from 0 to 0.59 with 
an average of 0.02. Table (2) also showed that the governance quality ranges from 2 to 10 with 
an average of (5.678) an indication that part of companies within sample over the study period 
violates the rules of corporate governance code. So far, Jordanian companies have not yet 
reached the phase of full compliance with corporate governance code issued by JSC. 
As reflected in table (2), the dividend to assets ratio ranges from 0 to 0.30 with an 
average of 0.025; dividend per share to EPS, which shows how much of a firm’s earnings are 
returned to shareholders in the form of dividends, ranges from 0 to 454.09 with an average of 
37.14. As well, the table also showed that 42.7% of the sample indicated that the firms’ strategy 
was to divide the profit between payments to shareholders and retained earnings and thus try to 
satisfy their shareholders’ need (i.e. Dividend payers) while 57.3% of the sample showed that the 
firms’ strategy was to retain the profit instead of distrusting it to shareholders in form of 
dividends (i.e. non-dividend payers).  
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for the study variables 
Variables Minimum Mean Maximum Std. Deviation 
GOV 2.00 5.678 10 1.78 
W_B .00 .043 .50 .089 
W_EXE .00 .0044 .22 .024 
W_OWN .00 .0031 .20 .015 
WM_OWN .0000 .02 .59 .073 
FS 5.67 7.37 9.25 .597 
LVG .00107 .341 1.08 .229 
ROA -45.49 2.42 36.02 9.36 
Div_TA .00 .025 .30 .0434 
Div_E .00 37.14 454.09 52.1 
Div_Dum 0 .427 1 .495 
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5.2. Correlation matrix 
Table (3) provides the correlation coefficients between the study variables. As can be observed 
from table (3) there are significant positive correlation coefficients between corporate 
governance quality, board gender diversity proxies and corporate dividend policy measures, an 
indication that strong corporate governance and diverse boards induce the firms not only to pay 
dividends but also to pay higher amount of dividends. 
Table (3) also showed that there is significant positive correlation coefficient between 
presence of women on boards and ROA which indicates that companies with diverse boards are 
more profitable than companies with non-diverse boards. Furthermore, the significant positive 
correlation coefficient between presence of women on boards and corporate governance quality 
implies that the presence of women on boards is considered a factor contributing to good 
corporate governance quality which supports the arguments of (Van Uytbergen&Schoubben, 
2015; Byoun et al., 2016). As well, the significant negative correlation coefficient between 
percentage of women on boards and financial leverage is an indication that women are more 
conservative than men which supports (Croson&Gneezy, 2009; Faccio et al., 2012; Huang 
&Kisgen, 2013; Van pelt 2013; Van Uytbergen&Schoubben, 2015) who argued that women are 
more risk averse in their financial decisions.  
 
Table 3: Correlation between study variables 
Variables Div_ 
Dum 
Div_ 
TA 
Div_ 
E 
GOV W_B W-
EXE 
W_OWN WM_ 
OWN 
FS LVG ROA 
Div_Dum 1           
Div_TA .629** 1          
Div_EPS .789** .571** 1         
GOV .132** .132** .127** 1        
W_B .074* .200** .143** .106** 1       
W_EXE .167** .192** .138** .116** .350** 1      
W_OWN .133** .104** .093** .035 .405** .314** 1     
WM_OWN .124** .112** .169** -.03 .168** .07 .095** 1    
FS  .322** .255** .185** .118** .012 .02 .023 -.004 1   
LVG -.195** -
.246** 
-
.168** 
-.091* -
.172** 
-
.147** 
-.076* .077* .261** 1  
ROA .541** .605** .364** .078* .143** .155** .034 .093** .340** -
.209** 
1 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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5.3. Results Discussion 
5.3.1 Logistic regression 
Table (4) depicts the results of logistic regression which aims to examine the impact of corporate 
governance quality and board gender diversity proxies on the likelihood of dividend payout 
taking into consideration firm size, financial leverage and return on assets. 
As can be observed from the table, the firm’s likelihood to pay dividends is affected 
positively by corporate governance quality at 0.01level of significance, which indicates that 
strong corporate governance reduces the conflict of interest in the firms and thus induces the 
firms to pay dividends to their shareholders. This outcome supports (Mitton, 2004; Kowalewski 
et al., 2008; Sawicki, 2009) and contradicts (Setiawan et al., 2013) who provided evidence 
showed that dividend policy is affected negatively by corporate governance. 
 
Table 4: Logistic regression results 
Variables (1) 
Div_Dum 
(2) 
Div_Dum 
(3) 
Div_Dum 
(4) 
Div_Dum 
(5) 
Div_Dum 
GOV .009** 
(.161) 
    
W_B  .041* 
(2.242) 
   
W_EXE   0.035* 
(10.861) 
  
W_OWN    0.01** 
(17.976) 
 
WM_OWN     .044* 
(2.866) 
FS .000** 
(1.044) 
.000** 
(1.098) 
0.000** 
(1.064) 
.000** 
(1.078) 
.000** 
(1.130) 
LVG .001 
(-1.752) 
.000** 
(-2.058) 
0.001** 
(-1.664) 
.000** 
(-1.698) 
.000** 
(-1.945) 
ROA .000** 
(.336) 
.000** 
(.340) 
0.000** 
(.331) 
.000** 
(.334) 
.000 
(.326) 
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Constant .000 
(-9.612) 
.000 
(-8.899) 
0.000 
(-8.886) 
.000 
(-8.989) 
.000 
(-9.275) 
COX & Snell R 
Square 
.428 .426 .427 .428 .426 
Note: 
The table presents the logistic regression results; the dependent variable is dividend dummy (DIV_dum), which 
equals one if a firm pays cash dividend and zero otherwise; GOV  is corporate governance quality which measured 
through governance index as shown in Table 1; W_B: is proportion of women on boards; W_EXE: is proportion of 
executive women on boards; W_OWN: is Percentage of shares held by women on boards; WM_OWN: is percentage 
of shares owned by company’s women major shareholders; FS is firm size measure as the natural logarithm of 
firm’s total assets; LVG is financial leverage measured as the ratio of total debt to total assets; ROA is return on 
assets calculated by dividing net income plus interest expense on the average total assets. The numbers in the 
parentheses are t -value. 
** Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).  
* Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
Table (4) also documented that the firm’s propensity to pay dividends is affected positively by 
the percentage of women on boards at 0.05 level of significance, which implies that the presence 
of women on boards plays an effective role in increasing firm’s likelihood  to pay dividends to 
shareholders. This result is consistent with (Byoun et al., 2016; Pucheta-Martínez & Bel-Oms, 
2015; Van Uytbergen & Schoubben 2015) who provided evidence showed that the presence of 
women on boards plays a role in corporate dividend policy.  
The results also revealed that percentage of executive women on boards has a positive significant 
impact on the firm’s likelihood to pay dividends to shareholders at 0.05 level of significance, 
which indicates that firms with more executive women on boards are more likely to pay 
dividends to their shareholders. This result is consistent with (Van Uytbergen&Schoubben, 
2015) who argued that firms with female in executive positions have higher cash buffers and 
thus are more likely to pay dividends. However, this result is inconsistent with (Pucheta-
Martínez & Bel-Oms, 2015). As reflected in table (4), the percentage of shares held by women 
on boards has a positive effect on the firm’s propensity to pay dividends at 0.01 level of 
significance, an indication that women tend to increase the firm’s likelihood  to pay dividends 
when they own shares which supports agency theorists’ argument in that having a considerable 
ownership of the company’s capital is a way to solve agency conflict of interest (Kiel & 
Nicholson 2003; Kajananthan & Achchuthan,2013; Al-Rahahleh, 2015). The result is also 
consistent with (Al-Malkawi2007;Al-Amarneh &Yaseen 2014;Van Uytbergen & Schoubben, 
2015; Pucheta-Martínez & Bel-Oms, 2015) and inconsistent with Van Pelt (2013). Table (4) also 
documented that the probability  to pay dividends is affected positively by the percentage of 
shares owned by company’s women major shareholders at 0.05 level of significance, which 
supports the argument that blockholders are probably to be more effective in monitoring 
management than dispersed and small shareholders since blockholders have essential investment 
and significant voting power to protect these investments (Sheikh et, al.2013; Al-Rahahleh, 
2015).The result is also consistent with the outcomes of (Al-Amarneh &Yaseen 2014) and 
inconsistent with the outcome of (Yusof & Ismail 2016). 
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The results also pointed out that the propensity to pay dividends is affected positively by firm 
size and profitability at 0.01 level of significance, which  indicate that large companies and 
profitable companies are more likely to pay dividends relative to small companies and less 
profitable companies. However, the firm’s likelihood  to pay dividends is affected negatively by 
firm’s financial leverage at 0.01 level of significance, an indication that companies suffer from 
high debt are less likely to pay dividends to their shareholders. These results are consistent with 
(Dickens et al., 2002; Ho, 2003; Aivazian et al., 2003; Maladjian & El Khoury, 2014; Kuzucu, 
2015; Yusof & Ismail 2016) 
5.3.2 OLS regression  
Table (5) presents the results of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analysis which aims to 
examine the impact of corporate governance quality and board gender diversity proxies on the 
amount of dividend payouts, using dividend to assets and dividend per share to EPS as proxies of 
dividend payout, taking into consideration firm size, financial leverage and return on assets. 
Table (5) showed that the dividend payout proxies namely; dividend per share to EPS and 
dividend to assets; are affected positively by corporate governance quality and board gender 
diversity proxies. Furthermore, the results also showed that firm dividend payout proxies are 
affected positively by firm size and firm profitability but negatively by firm financial leverage. 
These outcomes support the previous outcomes of logistic regression. Accordingly, it can be 
concluded that corporate governance quality and board gender diversity have significant positive 
impact not only on the propensity to pay dividends but also on the amount of dividend payouts. 
This result is consistent with (Byoun et al., 2016).  
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Table 5: OLS Regression results 
Note: 
The table provides the OLS regression results. For Models (1) to (5), the dependent variable is Div_Ecalculated as 
dividend per share divided by earnings per share before extraordinary items. For Models (6) to (10), the dependent 
variable is Div_TA calculated as dividend-to-asset ratio. GOV  is corporate governance quality which measured 
through governance index as shown in Table 1; W_B: is proportion of women on boards; W_EXE: is proportion of 
executive women on boards; W_OWN: is Percentage of shares held by women on boards; WM_OWN: is percentage 
of shares owned by company’s women major shareholders; FS is firm size measure as the natural logarithm of 
firm’s total assets; LVG is financial leverage measured as the ratio of total debt to total assets; ROA is return on 
assets calculated by dividing net income plus interest expense on the average total assets. The numbers in the 
parentheses are t -value. 
** Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).  
* Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
Variables (1) 
Div_E 
(2) 
Div_E 
(3) 
Div_E 
(4) 
Div_E 
(5) 
Div_E 
(6) 
Div_TA 
(7) 
Div_TA 
(8) 
Div_TA 
(9) 
Div_TA 
(10) 
Div_TA 
Gov 0.018* 
(2.376) 
    0.026* 
(2.224) 
    
W_B  0.02* 
(2.331) 
    .001** 
(3.427) 
   
W_EXE   0.033* 
(2.140) 
    .003** 
(3.031) 
  
W_OWN    .036* 
(2.104) 
    .012* 
(2.529) 
 
WM_OWN     .000** 
(4.717) 
    .007** 
2.716 
Size .005** 
(2.843) 
0.002** 
(3.156) 
0.002** 
(3.171) 
.002** 
(3.099) 
.000** 
(3.588) 
0.001** 
(3.330) 
.000** 
(3.627) 
.000** 
(3.646) 
.000** 
(3.558) 
.000** 
(3.871) 
LVG .001** 
(-
3.485) 
0.001** 
(-3.427) 
.000** 
(-3.529) 
.000** 
(-
3.612) 
.000** 
(-
4.382) 
0.000 
(-5.067) 
.000** 
(-4.855) 
.000** 
(-5.010) 
.000** 
(-5.156) 
.000** 
(-5.671) 
ROA .000** 
(7.875) 
0.000** 
7.614 
.000** 
(7.573) 
.000** 
(7.868) 
.000** 
(7.248) 
0.000** 
(16.757) 
.000** 
(16.427) 
.000** 
(16.348) 
.000** 
(16.773) 
.000** 
(16.262) 
Constant .089 
(-
1.704) 
.127 
(-1.528) 
.14 
(-1.479) 
.16 
(-
1.407) 
.064 
(-
1.854) 
.024 
(-2.258) 
.032 
(-2.151) 
.038 
(-2.076) 
.048 
(-1.978) 
.025 
(-2.246) 
Adj-R
2
 .154 .154 .153 .153 .172 .392 .397 .395 .393 .394 
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6. Conclusion 
 
This paper examines the impact of corporate governance quality and board gender diversity on 
corporate dividend policy for a set of all non-financial (i.e. industrial and service) companies 
listed on Amman Stock Exchange during the period (2009-2015). The results documented that 
corporate governance quality and board gender diversity proxies have positive impact not only 
on the propensity to pay dividends but also on the amount of dividend payouts. The outcomes 
also revealed that large companies and profitable companies are more likely to pay dividends to 
their shareholders, which may possibly refer that these companies tend to convey their good 
financial performance. Whereas, firms with high financial leverage are less likely to pay 
dividends to their shareholders, which may possibly refer that these companies need funds and 
thus tend to retain earnings instead of paying dividends. Moreover, the outcomes of the 
correlation matrix indicated that companies with diverse boards are more profitable than 
companies with non- diverse boards; the presence of women on boards is considered a factor 
contributing to good corporate governance quality; and women are more conservative and risk 
averse in their financial decisions relative to men. 
 
The results of descriptive statistics showed that presence of women on the boards of non-
financial companies in Jordan ranges from 0 to .50 with an average of 0.043, an indication that 
the women representation on the boards of non-financial companies in Jordan is considered low 
relative to other developing and developed countries, which implies that Jordanian companies 
are very far from achieving the quota of 40% women on boards. Particularly, the causes of poor 
gender diversity at the boards of Jordanian companies range from lack of awareness about the 
benefits of gender diversity on boards to the lack of legislations that regulate this issue where the 
existing legislations and the corporate governance code in Jordan have not yet taken any step 
towards the issue of gender diversity on boards.  Furthermore, the descriptive statistics showed 
the corporate governance quality for companies within the sample ranges from 2 to 10, an 
indication that some of companies within the sample violate the rules of corporate governance 
code. So far, Jordanian companies have not yet reached the phase of full compliance with the 
corporate governance code, which may mainly refer to the flexibility given to Jordanian 
companies through the “comply or explain” approach instead of the “comply or penalty” 
approach.  
 
The results of the study have implicit recommendations for regulatory bodies in Jordan and for 
non-financial companies listed on ASE. Particularly, regulatory bodies in Jordan should take a 
step towards encouraging gender diversity on boards initially through “comply or explain” 
approach. As well, non-financial companies should boost their compliance with corporate 
governance code and adopt diversity policies to enhance the effectiveness of the boards and keep 
favorable relationships with their shareholders. 
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